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Desislava Kraleva 
Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
Legal Aspects of the Transitional Arrangements 
Introduction 
There are four fundamental freedoms which lay the foundation of the 
European Union. Those are the free movement of goods, free movement of 
capital, free movement of services and free movement of persons. They 
guarantee the existence and effective functioning of an area without internal 
borders within which goods, capital, services and people move freely. 
Despite the pivotal importance of these freedoms, there are cases where some 
freedoms can be partially or fully restricted within the territory of some 
member states or the Union as a whole. This thesis is going to analyze the 
restrictions of one of these freedoms: the free movement of persons, resulting 
from the arrangements applying to new member states. The focus will be the 
free movement of workers from new to old member states for a transitional 
period following the date of accession. 
Theoretically, the transitional arrangements are flexible provisions which 
offer two-way protection, to both old and new member states. Despite the fact 
that they are imposed by the old members and their economic justification is 
questionable, they also protect the vital interests of new member states. 
Particular instruments for this protection are the standstill and safeguard 
clauses. The standstill clause guarantees that old member states will not apply 
to new member states stricter regimes than the ones in force at the date of 
signing of the accession treaties. Thus, the standstill clause protects new 
members guaranteeing them a minimum standard of treatment. The safeguard Desislava Kraleva 
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clause envisages the opportunity for old member states which remove the 
restrictions before the end of the transitional period to reintroduce them, if 
serious disturbances on their labor markets occur. Thus, old member states are 
protected in the event of undesired developments. 
However in practice, these provisions do not function perfectly. New member 
states possess very weak leverages to influence the negotiation and imposition 
of transitional arrangements and old member states often abuse the 
restrictions and use them for domestic political purposes. The protection 
which theoretically exists in both directions in practice functions better in one 
of them. 
This thesis will study the theoretical foundation and justification of the 
transitional arrangements. Its aim is to ascertain whether the discrepancy 
claimed above actually exists and whether transitional arrangements favor old 
member states to the detriment of new member countries. Through a study of 
the theoretical foundation and the actual state of affairs, the validity of the 
hypothesis will be assessed. 
As a beginning, the fundamental freedoms as such and the free movement of 
persons in particular will be examined. The overview of the historical 
development will be followed by the economic and political justification of 
the transitional periods, as well as the migration predictions in the context of 
enlargement. Special attention shall be given to the evaluation of the actual 
migration flows in comparison with the initial projections and the impact of 
migrants on the host country. Furthermore, two country cases from 2011 will 
be analyzed. The case of the Netherlands exemplifies the dubious use of the 
standstill clause and the case of Spain sets a precedent with the activation of 
the safeguard clause. As a result of this analysis, the provisions of the 
accession treaties will be discussed in a new light and the hypothesis stated 
above shall be proven or dismissed. 
  Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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1.  The Fundamental Freedoms of the EU –  
Historical Overview 
The creation of a common market (which after the coming into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon is renamed internal market) is one of the fundamental goals 
of the European Union. It is laid down in Article 3 (3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which states that “(t)he Union shall establish an 
internal market”
1. Title 1 of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) provides more specific information on the core of 
the internal market and its essential properties. Article 26 (2) of the TFEU 
stipulates that the internal market is “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”
2. These four freedoms, the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, form the very 
foundation of the internal market, for which reason they are referred to as the 
Fundamental Freedoms. This thesis is going to look at restrictions applying to 
one of these fundamental freedoms, namely the free movement of persons. 
However, in order to be able to thoroughly analyze the arrangements 
restricting the freedom and fully comprehend their significance, a brief 
historical overview of the development of the free movement of persons is in 
order. 
The first provisions relating to the free movement of persons date back to the 
Treaty Establishing the Coal and Steel Community. Its Article 69 (1) reads 
that “Member states undertake to remove any restriction based on nationality 
upon the employment in the coal and steel industries of workers who are 
nationals of Member states”
3. Even though the scope of the freedom was 
strictly limited to the coal and steel industry, this provision laid the foundation 
of the free movement of persons within what was to become the European 
Union. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) 
elaborates on the free movement of workers and extends it to the right to 
 
1   Treaty on the European Union, Article 3 (3). 
2   Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 26 (2). 
3   Treaty Establishing the Coal and Steel Community, Article 69 (1). Desislava Kraleva 
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move in order “to accept offers of employment actually made”
4 as well as “to 
move about freely for this purpose within the territory of Member States”
5. 
This is a substantial step forward and marks a tendency to broaden the scope 
of the provision, extending it not only to actually employed persons but also 
to ones pursuing employment. Even though there are certain derogations from 
this right, it is made explicitly clear that all “discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States, as regards employment, 
remuneration and other working conditions”
6 shall be abolished. For the 
achievement of these purposes a number of secondary legislative acts were 
adopted, the most significant being Council Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 
(adopted on 15 October 1968) and Council Directive 68/360 (adopted on 15 
October 1968). These acts are of pivotal importance, especially Regulation 
1612/68, which prohibits any EU national to “be treated differently from 
national workers by reason of his nationality in respect of any conditions of 
employment and work”
7. These legislative acts will be analyzed with more 
details further. 
By the time the Single European Act was signed in 1987, the rights to free 
movement had been extended to self-employed persons. However, the status 
of posted workers who temporarily held a position in another member state 
was significantly clarified later by the Council Directive 96/71 of 16 
December 1996.
8 
After the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987, an area 
without boundaries was officially announced and this was a significant step 
forward in the development of the fundamental freedoms. The pivotal change 
brought about by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was the creation of EU 
citizenship, which encompassed the right to move and reside freely within the 
 
4   Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Article 48 (3) a. 
5   Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Article 48 (3) b. 
6   Ibid, Article 48 (2). 
7   Regulation (EEC) 1612/68, Article 7 (1). 
8   Baldoni, Emiliana, “The Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: A Legal-
historical Overview”, PIONEUR Working Paper, No. 2, Florence: 2003. 
  Online at: http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/bajaarchivo_public.php?iden=40. 
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EU. The amended Article 6, contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 
reaffirms the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. What is 
more, a procedure is envisaged in case a member state infringes the founding 
principles of the Union, so that the protection is observed. The Treaty of Nice 
(2001) enhanced the protection through the addition of a prevention 
mechanism. The provisions refer to the “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law”
9. Despite the fact that this article does 
not specifically refer to free movement of persons, we could extend the scope 
of protection to include it as well. 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not introduce dramatic changes with regard to the 
fundamental freedoms. The free movement of goods is regulated by Articles 
28 through 37 of the TFEU, free movement of persons – by Articles 48-54, 
freedom to provide services – Articles 56-62, and free movement of capital – 
Articles 63-66. The regime itself has not been changed. 
The specific provision relating to the free movement of persons within the EU 
is Article 45 of the TFEU. It stipulates that all discrimination on grounds of 
nationality regarding employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
employment shall be abolished. The secondary act corresponding to this 
primary law provision is Regulation (EEC) 1612/68. Due to the numerous 
amendments made to this regulation, it was codified in 2011“in the interests 
of clarity and rationality”
10 by Regulation (EU) 492/2011. It lays down in 
detail the concrete rights that the free movement of workers confers to 
individuals.  
Section I of the Regulation stipulates the right of EU citizens to undertake 
employment anywhere within the EU, to receive the same assistance as the 
country’s nationals when seeking employment and their equality with regard 
to the entry requirements which apply to them and a country’s own nationals. 
 
9   Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 6. 
10  Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union (codification). Desislava Kraleva 
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Section II of the Regulation deals with the right of workers from other 
member states to be treated in the same way as citizens of the host member 
state with regard to the conditions of employment, membership in trade 
unions, rights and benefits concerning social security and housing, including 
the right to claim housing assistance. 
However, at the time of signing the accession treaties, the legislative act in 
force was Regulation (EEC) 1612/68. For this reason I will refer to it when 
discussing the transitional arrangements despite its subsequent codification by 
Regulation (EU) 492/2011. 
The provisions regulating the fundamental freedoms are directly applicable 
and refer to citizens of the EU member states. They require a transboundary 
element to be evoked and can be defended in front of the Court of Justice of 
the EU. 
The Court of Justice of the EU (or also Court of Justice in preceding stages of 
its development) has played a vital role in the enhancement of the 
fundamental freedoms. Its judgments have persistently extended their scope 
and confined the grounds for limitations. Following amendments made in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Court was empowered to decide whether an 
institution had committed a violation.
11 In the subsequent development of the 
EU, the CJEU has continued to take a restrictive stance on the limitation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of EU citizens and to give them a broad 
interpretation. 
   
 
11   European  Commission,  Fundamental  rights and non-discrimination, 2011. 
Online at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/ 
amsterdam_treaty/a10000_en.htm. Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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2.  Transitional Arrangements as Derogation from the 
Free Movement of Persons 
2.1. Nature of the Transitional Arrangements 
The free movement of persons can be subdivided depending on whether we 
refer to natural or legal persons. Here only the free movement of workers will 
be examined as part of the more general fundamental freedom of movement 
of persons. Following the case law of the Court of Justice, a worker is a 
person who is engaged on a permanent basis, who is subject to orders and 
receives remuneration for their labor. 
As stated in the previous part, the Court of Justice of the EU has adopted a 
narrow approach towards any restriction of the fundamental freedoms. This 
certainly applies to the free movement of workers. However, there are 
arrangements which make it legally possible for member states to impose 
restrictions on the free movement of workers over a period of time. These are 
the transitional arrangements, which apply to newly acceded member states. 
In some cases they also extend to the freedom to provide services however 
their general application regards the free movement of workers from new to 
old member states. 
Transitional arrangements were first introduced during the Mediterranean 
enlargement of the EU in the 1980s, Greece joined the EU in 1981 and Spain 
and Portugal followed in 1986. Due to the geographical proximity and large 
differences in wage levels, old member states feared a massive influx of 
migrants to their labor markets. Even though these fears proved unjustified, 
the transitional arrangements were reapplied in the 2004 enlargement of the 
EU and later on in the 2007 enlargement. They allow for a limited derogation 
from the principle of free movement of workers for a maximum of seven 
years. This period is divided into three phases, during which the restrictions 
diminish in scope and it becomes increasingly more difficult for member 
states to justify them. The so-called “2+3+2” formula determines the length of 
application of the varying regimes. 
During the first two years after accession, member states apply national 
measures to new members which results in “legally different regimes for Desislava Kraleva 
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access to the labor markets”
12. During this stage some member states have 
opened their labor markets completely (e.g. Sweden for both waves of 
enlargement), or have introduced stringent restrictions (e.g. Austria, 
Denmark, Belgium and France for both waves of enlargement). 
The second phase of the transition period is essentially an extension of the 
first for member states that notify the Commission before the first stage has 
expired. In case they fail to do so, all restrictions drop off and EU law on free 
movement of workers fully applies. 
The end of the second phase is in principle the end of transitional 
arrangements. However, it is envisaged that member states which maintain 
restrictions in force during the second phase and which experience or expect 
serious disturbances on their labor markets, may prolong the restrictions for 
an additional and final two-year period. Prior to doing so, they need to notify 
the Commission. 
The seven-year period for member states which acceded in 2004 expired on 
30 April 2011. The seven-year period which is running for Bulgaria and 
Romania will expire on 31 December 2013. Below I will examine in detail the 
specificities which apply to the countries of the two enlargements, compare 
them and examine the reasons behind them. 
It is important to note that every country applying restrictions towards new 
member states can decide to remove them at any time after the expiration of 
the initial period of two years. Further, any country which has removed the 
restrictions towards the free movement of workers can apply the so called 
“safeguard clause” to member states during the transitional period in “urgent 
and exceptional cases”
13. In August 2011 Spain became the first state to rely 
on this clause and reintroduced restrictions towards Romanian workers, after 
having liberalized access to its labor market in 2009. I am going to look into 
the specificities of this case in Part 5. 
 
12  European Commission, Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements 
set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004–30 April 2006), Brussels, 
2006. 
13  Act of Accession of Romania, Annex VII Part 1, Paragraph 7, third Subparagraph, 
2005. Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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However, there are certain restrictions on the application of transitional 
arrangements. First of all, they only refer to workers within the meaning of 
Article 45 of the TFEU. They do not apply to self-employed people and 
posted workers. Furthermore, they only concern access to the labor market – 
once a person is legally employed, there can be no discrimination with regard 
to the conditions of employment. This refers to remuneration, working 
conditions, social and tax advantages. Last but not least, even when 
transitional arrangements are in force, the citizens of EU member states to 
which they refer, should be preferred for employment over third-country 
nationals coming from outside the EU. 
These conditions guarantee that the barrier of the transitional arrangements 
aims to solely restrict access to the labor markets of certain member states. 
Once the barrier is passed, no differentiation whatsoever on the grounds of 
nationality is permitted. 
2.2. Reasons for the Implementation of Transitional Arrangements 
There are essentially two types of reasons for the introduction of transitional 
arrangements. On the one hand, there are economic considerations related to 
the free movement of production factors and their impact on the economy of 
the countries and the welfare of their citizens. On the other hand, there is the 
public fear that this might have an overly negative effect on nationals of the 
member states towards which the production factors (here - labor) move. 
Popular fears have become a political justification for the introduction of 
transitional arrangements. Supported or suggested for economic reasons, 
politicians have often preferred to opt for more stringent and popularly more 
acceptable policies, thus imposing restrictions on the free movement of 
workers from new member states. 
The economic grounds relate to factor market integration which occurs once 
all obstacles to the free movement of production factors are removed. This 
can be seen if we take the example of two countries which have different 
labor forces and different marginal products of labor, which is the “increase in 
output due to a small increase in the amount of labor used”
14. We presume 
 
14   Hagen von, Jürgen, “Class notes“, Bonn, 2010. Desislava Kraleva 
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that old member states are Country A, which have higher marginal product of 
labor (and thus higher real wages) and the newly acceded member states, with 
a lower marginal product of labor (and real wages), are country B. We also 
presume that the supply of labor in Country B is more abundant than the 
supply of labor in Country A. When markets are opened completely, what 
happens is that workers from Country B migrate to Country A, attracted by 
the higher real wages there. The supply of labor in the destination country, 
Country A, increases and the real wage is driven down. The opposite happens 
in Country B, the country from which workers migrate. There, the supply of 
labor decreases and therefore the real wages soar. This process continues until 
the establishment of equilibrium, i.e. when the real wage in Country A equals 
the real wage in Country B. 
All in all, this process leads to higher combined output of the two economies 
and the redistribution of income and capital between them. It is considered 
that while this process is profitable for workers and capital owners in the 
country of migration, Country B, it is to the disadvantage of workers and 
capital owners of the destination country, Country A. 
However, this scenario would develop differently if capital market integration 
takes place before labor market integration is allowed for. If this happens, 
investments cause the economy of Country B to modernize and increase its 
efficiency. Thus, there is a fairly high likelihood that real wages in both 
economies equalize before the labor markets integrate. This will remove the 
stimulus for workers from Country B to migrate to Country A and will 
prevent unwanted redistribution effects that this movement would inflict upon 
Country A. Thus, if migration from Country B is restricted for a certain 
period of time, capital market integration will have time to take effect and 
prevent unwanted high levels of migration from new to old member states. 
This is the economic justification for the imposition of transitional 
arrangements. Relying on this economic model, old member states feared that 
if labor markets are integrated right away, this may lead to uncontrolled 
waves of migration from new member states. As seen above, this would have 
had undesired results on the real wages and workers in old member states. 
Thus a Transitional period was arranged, during which capital market Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
 
 13
integration had time to take effect and remove the incentives for workers to 
move from new to old member states. 
The second justification for the establishment of the transitional arrangements 
was public opinion which shaped political opinion. Stemming from the 
reasons listed above, the citizens of the old member states had considerable 
fears that the accession of new and poorer member countries would lead to 
mass migration to the old member states, which would negatively affect their 
income and employment situation. These concerns were aggravated by the 
large number of countries that were to join in 2004, an unprecedented 10 new 
member states. Clearly, public opinion is a strong driver of political action. 
The politicians of the old member states could not afford to ignore the opinion 
of their voters and this is the second reason why the transitional period was 
established. 
These are the grounds from which transitional arrangements stem. Whether 
their economic justification was convincing or whether public fears where 
well grounded will be examined in the following sections. 
3.  The Experience of Applying Transitional 
Arrangements 
3.1. First Application of Transitional Arrangements –  
the Mediterranean Enlargement 
Transitional arrangements as such, were first applied towards countries which 
joined the EU in the 1980s. Greece, Spain and Portugal were the first 
countries subjected to restrictions to the free movement of workers. However, 
there are some crucial differences between the context of application of 
restrictions towards them and the context in which the free movement of 
workers is restricted for states of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. First of all, 
the concept of EU citizenship was not fully developed at the time of the 
Mediterranean enlargement. Second of all, the project of the internal market 
was far from completed and the free movement of workers is a cornerstone of 
the internal market. Both factors “increase the political significance of not 
extending the right of free movement of labor to the east European Desislava Kraleva 
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societies”
15. Of more importance was that when considering the application of 
restrictive regimes towards the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, old member 
states already had the experience of the previous enlargements which had 
disproved fears of large migration flows. At the time of accession, all 
countries of the Mediterranean enlargement had significantly lower wages in 
comparison with the rest of the EU and experienced high levels of 
unemployment. Despite these facts, the expectations of a large influx of 
migrants towards old member states was not fulfilled and as the Commission 
concluded in 2001, Spain and Portugal actually experienced net 
immigration.
16 
3.2. The Experience of the 2004 Enlargement 
3.2.1. Predictions of Migration Flows Prior to Enlargement 
In spite of the experience of the Mediterranean enlargement which had proven 
concerns to be unjustified, the 2004 enlargement posed additional challenges. 
It involved the accession of an unprecedented number of countries, some of 
which were ex-communist and all of them with significantly lower living 
standards and real wages than the rest of the EU. This revived fears that mass 
migration to the “richer West” would occur after accession. A debate was 
triggered and a number of studies were produced aiming to predict the 
developments following enlargement. It is important to note that despite their 
abundance, the studies failed to reach a single unambiguous conclusion. This 
is due to their different methodologies and whether they focus on migration as 
such (including economically inactive actors such as students and pensioners), 
or limit themselves to workers. The two basic types of methodology are 
surveys and quantitative models. Surveys record intentions and desires and 
thus fail to depict actual movements. Model-based studies rely on a number of 
assumptions and determining factors, which again results in a high level of 
 
15   Bohle, Dorothee and Dóra Husz, “Whose Europe Is It? Interest group action in 
accession negotiations: the cases of competition policy and labor migration”, 
L'HarmattanPolitique européenne, Vol. 15, Paris, 2005: 85-112. 
  Online at: http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2005-1-page-85.htm. 
16   European Commission, Information note, The Free Movement of Workers in the 
Context of Enlargement, Brussels, 2001. Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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uncertainty.
17 The differences are illustrated by Table 1 of the publication and 
show the variation of predictions. Due to space limitations, I will not go into 
the details of each particular study, but will instead summarize their main 
findings and the trends they outline. 
The majority of researchers predict relatively modest numbers of workers 
from new member states migrating to old member states, if the free 
movement of workers is fully allowed. These researchers predict an initial 
sharp migration flow, which will decline over time. However, even in the 
initial period of higher migration, the numbers of work migrants is projected 
to be well under the absorption capacity of the host countries. 
A representative study for this type of conclusion is the study conducted by 
Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker, “Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labor 
Markets: Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities”
18. They use the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model to build their predictions about the 
impact of enlargement on employment and wages in the European Union. 
They also examine the channels through which labor markets can be affected, 
namely trade, foreign direct investment and migration. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will only outline their findings regarding migration. 
The researchers concluded that levels of migration depend on factors such as 
differences in per capita income and employment rates in the sending and 
destination countries. According to their estimations, the number of citizens 
of the Central and East European Countries (CEEC) residing in the EU may 
increase from 0.85 to 3.9 million after the enlargement, as about one third of 
migrants are expected to be employees. These figures correspond to about 4% 
of the population of CEEC and 1% of the population of the old member 
states. Even though the authors concluded that the migration flows would not 
be negligible, they also admit that they would not be as large as feared. 
Another important conclusion concerns the unequal distribution of migration, 
i.e. some member states are more likely to receive migrant workers than 
 
17   Ibid. 
18   Boeri, Tito and Herbert Brücker, “Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labor Markets: 
Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities”, World Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2001. 
  Online at: http://www.eabcn.org/research/documents/boeri_brucker.pdf. Desislava Kraleva 
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others. This particularly refers to Germany and Austria, which absorbed about 
80% of the overall migration from CEEC prior to accession and which were 
the strongest proponents of transitional arrangements. However, it should be 
stressed once again that “the impact of migration on the labor market 
performance of natives is much smaller than widely believed”
19. 
The overall conclusion is that despite being larger, in comparison with 
previous enlargements, migration following the accession of CEEC would not 
have the disastrous effects public opinion predicted. On the contrary, due to 
the aging population of Europe, migration is needed in order to preserve a 
sustainable ratio between workers and dependents.
20 Therefore, in the long 
term migration should actually be encouraged instead of restricted. 
Other studies come to similar conclusions, that there would be negligible 
negative effects on the host countries in terms of wage dumping and 
unemployment. Despite a general conclusion that enlargement is a win-win 
game, some researchers have suggested that any negative effects will be borne 
by the sending country and the blue-collar workers in the receiving country. 
An example for this is the study of Hubertus Hille and Thomas Straubhaar 
“The Impact of the EU-Enlargement on Migration Movements and Economic 
Integration: Results of Recent Studies”
21. It applies the method of 
extrapolation and uses the findings following the Mediterranean enlargement 
for its estimations. As a result, the authors conclude that the expected effects 
of the Eastern enlargement are far from the catastrophic fears of public 
opinion. These conclusions are supported by the research paper of Fritz 
Breuss “Macroeconomic effects of EU enlargement for old and new 
 
19   Ibid. 
20   Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, United 
Nations, Population Division, New York, 2001. 
Online at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ReplMigED/Cover.pdf. 
21   Hille, Hubertus and Thomas Straubhaar, “The Impact of the EU-Enlargement on 
Migration Movements and Economic Integration: Results of Recent Studies”, in: 
Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe: 
OECD, 2001: 79-100. 
Online at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/8101041 
e.pdf?expires=1344926046&id=id&accname=ocid53021578&checksum=BB729753B
80C2E69AB4983A0A18F49FC. Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
 
 17
members”
22. On the basis of the developed simulations, the author concludes 
that for both the EU and the CEEC, the “EU enlargement is a win-win 
situation”
23. Despite the varying distribution of benefits, it is clearly a 
situation with no outright losers. 
These conclusions are furthered by a number of other studies and despite 
variations in the models and the details of the findings, they clearly ascertain 
that the opening of the labor markets of the old member states for the new 
ones does not have dramatic negative consequences for any of the parties. 
3.2.2. Transitional Arrangements in the Accession Treaty 
Despite the evidence given above, that there is no actual ground for concern 
regarding a massive inflow of labor migrants, a political decision was taken to 
introduce restrictive regimes. Its biggest proponents were Germany and 
Austria, which absorbed the highest levels of migration prior to enlargement 
and felt that a transitional regime would make the Eastern enlargement 
publicly more acceptable. As a result of that, there were clauses in the 
accession treaties of the Central and East European countries, regulating the 
transitional arrangements. 
The transitional arrangements constitute derogation from fundamental 
freedoms and are laid down in the accession treaties of the new member 
states. The legal basis in the Treaty of Accession 2003 is found in Part Four 
Temporary Provisions, Title I Transitional Measures. Article 24 stipulates 
that: “The measures listed in Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII 
and XIV to this Act shall apply in respect of the new Member States under the 
conditions laid down in those Annexes.”
24 The transitional arrangements 
 
22   Breuss, Fritz, “Macroeconomic effects of EU enlargement for old and new members”, 
WIFO Working papers, No. 143, 2001. 
Online at: http://fritz.breuss.wifo.ac.at/Breuss.PDF. 
23   Ibid. 
24  Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded, Article 24, Official Journal of the European Union, 23 
September 2003. Desislava Kraleva 
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applied to all new member states except Malta and Cyprus, which due to their 
specific geographical endowments were not perceived as potential sources of 
huge labor migration. The specifics of the arrangements applying to member 
states are laid down in detail in country-specific annexes. 
Even though there are certain variations among the annexes applying to 
different countries, the arrangements regulating the restrictions are absolutely 
identical. Having this in mind, I will use Annex V, referring to the Czech 
Republic, as a means of analyzing the restrictions contained in all of them. 
The provisions regulating the transitional arrangements applying to the free 
movement of persons are contained in Part I of the Annex. It begins with 
listing the legal basis, which regulates the free movement of workers. 
Following, in Paragraph 2, the Annex refers to the secondary legislative act 
which governs the technicalities of the application of the free movement of 
workers. As already noted, this is Regulation (EEC) 1612/68. Its Articles 1 
through 6 shall not apply for a two-year period. Instead, national measures or 
the ones resulting from bilateral agreements shall govern the access of new 
member states to the labor markets of old member states. At the end of the 
initial period of two years, the application of national measures can be 
extended for an additional period of three more years. However, this 
derogation does not apply to nationals of new member states who were legally 
employed in an old member state for an uninterrupted period of 12 or more 
months prior to the coming into force of the accession treaty. These nationals 
retain access to the labor market of the state where they were employed and 
are not affected by the suspension of Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 
(EEC) 1612/68. However, this right is only confined to the labor market of 
the member state in question. It does not extend to the labor markets of other 
old member states. The voluntary leaving of employment by the workers 
automatically entails cessation of the right. Employment of less than 12 
months would not provide ground for the right at all. 
Paragraph 3 of Annex V regards a report which the Commission is obliged to 
prepare at the end of the initial two-year period. On the basis of this report, 
the Council shall review the functioning of the transitional arrangements. 
Following this revue any state that wishes to continue the application of Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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restrictive measures, needs to inform the Commission of their intention before 
the expiration of the initial two years. A failure to do so would lead to the 
automatic application of Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 
from the date after the end of the two-year period. 
The newly acceded member states can also demand a further review, as 
stipulated by Paragraph 4 of the Annex. The Commission is then obliged to 
prepare a report stating the grounds for the review within six months after the 
receipt of the request. The procedure described above shall apply. 
The application of restrictions during the third and final period of the 
transitional arrangements is governed by Paragraph 5, which envisages the 
opportunity to extend the restrictive regime for a maximum of two more years 
after the expiration of the initial five years. However, it is explicitly stated 
that this can only be done “in case of serious disturbances of its labor market 
or threat thereof”
25. In order to do this, the member state wishing to extend the 
transitional period needs to inform the Commission beforehand. The final 
date until which restrictions can apply is the end of the seventh year after 
accession. After this date, Article 45 of the TFEU and Articles 1 through 6 of 
Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 shall apply in their entirety. 
If old member states have already begun to apply the provisions of Articles 1 
through 6 towards new member states but have a system of issuing working 
permits for monitoring purposes, they will continue its application 
automatically. 
However, certain protection is envisaged for member states which open their 
labor markets right away or lift the restrictions earlier. If their labor markets 
are seriously disrupted or there is a reason to anticipate such a disruption, the 
member states in question can evoke the so-called “safeguard clause”, 
contained in Paragraph 7, second sub-paragraph. The procedure for its 
application requires that the member state which wants to evoke it needs to 
supply all relevant information to the Commission and the other member 
states. After receiving the request and the supporting information, the 
Commission shall decide on the suspension of Articles 1 through 6 of 
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Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 by the requesting member state with regard to the 
new members. Only urgent cases justify the suspension of these articles 
before the notification and decision of the Commission. It is interesting to 
note that the safeguard clause can be activated both by old towards new 
member states and among new member states themselves. This means if a 
country from the 2004 enlargement experiences or foresees disruptions on its 
labor market, caused by another country from the 2004 enlargement, it can 
evoke the safeguard clause with regard to it. 
The further paragraphs of the Annex refer to the right of the family members 
of the worker to have access to the labor market of the receiving country 
under certain conditions (Paragraph 8). It is envisaged that the new member 
states, which are in a transitional period, may apply the restrictions 
reciprocally towards the old member states. 
It is essential to note that according to Paragraph 12 of the Annex, any 
member state may decide to apply “greater freedom of movement than that 
existing at the date of accession, including full labor market access”
26. In case 
such a decision is not taken at the date of accession, member states may 
decide to liberalize access to their labor market at any time after the second 
year of accession. 
At the special insistence of Germany and Austria, a list of sensitive areas in 
which the freedom to provide services may be restricted is included in all 
annexes to the Accession treaty of 2003. Derogation from the free provision 
of services is again preceded by notification of the Commission and member 
states to which it applies can respond with reciprocal measures. Importantly, 
the measures achieved as a result of these restrictions can by no means be 
more stringent than the ones applying on the date of accession of the new 
member states. This clause, also known as the “standstill clause” will be 
analyzed in detail in Section 4. 
The second subparagraph of Paragraph 14 states that even in the case when 
transitional arrangements apply with regard to a certain member state, its 
workers should be given preference to workers from outside the EU. Workers 
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and their families which legally reside and work in another member state 
should be given at least the same treatment as third-country nationals residing 
in the same country. 
These provisions regulate in detail the application of the transitional 
arrangements towards new member countries. Several important conclusions 
can be made. First of all, the division of the transitional period into phases 
gives the opportunity of member states to change the regimes in force with 
regard to the conditions on their labor markets. The changes can be in both 
directions, meaning that they can liberalize the access or rely on the safeguard 
clause in order to reintroduce restrictions. The safeguard clause is a valid 
option both for old and new member states. Secondly, the new member states 
have the opportunity to apply reciprocal measures towards the member states 
which are restricting access to their labor markets. Even though the practical 
effect of reciprocal treatment is doubtful, it gives a sense of justice for the 
countries in transitional periods. Thirdly, the family members of legally 
employed workers also enjoy the right to access the labor markets of the host 
state. Last but not least, it is important that even in the event of activation of 
the safeguard clause, workers cannot be treated in a stricter way in 
comparison with the initial period of the transitional arrangements. This is 
essential in order to avoid the possibility of applying excessively stringent 
restrictions to new member states at later stages of the transition period. 
3.2.3. Fears and Reality – Were the Initial Concerns Justified 
After a detailed analysis of the transitional arrangements, it is necessary to 
examine their effect in practice and compare it to the initial predictions and 
fears. The most encompassing sources of relevant information are the reports 
prepared by the Commission at the end of the first stage of the transitional 
period. 
The Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 
2003 Accession Treaty was issued on 8.2.2006. It studies the period from 1 
May 2004 to 30 April 2006. On the basis of national statistical data, the 
Commission concluded that “mobility flows between the EU-10 and the EU-
15 are very limited and are simply not large enough to affect the EU labor Desislava Kraleva 
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market in general”
27. Moreover, there was no drastic increase in the 
percentage of EU-10 citizens as a part of the EU-15 population before and 
after enlargement. The only exceptions to this general conclusion were the 
UK, Ireland and Austria. However in Austria, the number of labor migrants 
stabilized in 2005. The report goes on to outline that no direct link was found 
between the transitional arrangements in place and the migration flows. 
Following a detailed discussion of the various determinants of migration, the 
Commission stated that factors related to the supply and demand of labor are 
much more important to labor mobility than transitional arrangements. 
The report addressed the fears of old member states prior to enlargement, that 
the full liberalization of their labor markets may have strong negative effects. 
The empirical evidence demonstrated that there was no negative effect on the 
labor markets – on the contrary, several positive effects were observed. First 
of all, the EU-10 nationals included in the labor force contributed to the better 
overall performance of the host countries. Enlargement helped formalize the 
underground economy and thus improved the public finances of receiving 
countries. Instead of substituting, workers from the EU-10 complemented 
workers of the host country, thus dispelling the fears that national workers 
would be left unemployed due to an influx of foreigners. Last but not least, 
workers of EU-10 have helped to alleviated skill bottlenecks and “contribute 
to long-term growth through human capital accumulation”
28. 
On the whole, the Report shows that fears associated with the liberalization of 
the labor markets were largely unjustified. Furthermore, the limited migration 
flows from new to old member states was found to have largely positive 
effects on the latter. On this basis, the Commission “recommends that the 
Member States carefully consider whether the continuation of these 
restrictions is needed, in the light of the situation of their labor market and of 
the evidence of this report”
29. 
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Following the publication of the report, several member states liberalized 
their regimes applying to EU-10 nationals. In 2006, labor markets were 
opened in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Italy. In 2007 Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands followed and in 2008 France removed all restrictions. 
Two years after this report, several member states availed themselves of a 
right conferred to them by Paragraph 4 of Part I of the Annexes V, VI, VIII, 
IX, X, XII, XIII and XIV. This provision gives member states, to which 
transitional arrangements apply the right to request the Commission to 
prepare a further report and the Council to perform another review. The report 
was issued on 18.11.2008 and once again confirmed that serious disruptions 
on the labor markets caused by EU-10 nationals was highly unlikely. What is 
more, evidence showed that migration had already peaked and that further 
increases were not expected. The Commission stated again its earlier finding 
that the migration flows are rather driven by labor demand and supply than by 
the restrictive regimes in place. More importantly the preservation of these 
regimes can actually be harmful to the member states imposing them, as it 
may delay necessary labor market adjustments. The final conclusion of the 
Commission was that “the overall impact of post-enlargement mobility has 
been positive”
30. Recalling that the free movement of workers is one of the 
fundamental freedoms under the EC Treaty and considering the political 
significance of the removal of restrictions, the Commission recommended that 
member states “consider whether they need to continue applying 
restrictions”
31. Even the serious economic situation, in which the report was 
prepared, in the view of the Commission, was not a serious reason to maintain 
restrictions. It simply made reference to the safeguard clause and reminded 
member states that they can rely on it until the end of the seven-year period 
following enlargement. 
In 2009 two more member states – Belgium and Denmark – ended the 
restrictions applying to member states from the 2004 enlargement. Hungary, 
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which was applying reciprocal measures, also removed the restrictions. In this 
way, only two member states – Germany and Austria – continued to apply 
restrictions until the end of the seven-year period, which expired on 31 April 
2011. Since then, all member states which joined the EU in 2004 have 
enjoyed full free movement for their workers within the territory of the whole 
EU without restrictions. 
3.3. The Experience of the 2007 Enlargement 
3.3.1. Predictions of Migration Flows Prior to Enlargement 
Similarly to the 2004 enlargement, prior to the 2007 enlargement there were 
numerous studies on prospective migration trends. The methodology used 
varies widely, starting from extrapolation of the trends observed in previous 
enlargement waves and stretching to research into the desires of people to 
move and the practical steps taken in that direction. However, to summarize 
the various studies into two broad categories, they would be research into the 
migration trends of Bulgaria and Romania as part of the broad scope of 
Central and East European Countries, and individual country studies. The 
research of both types reveals different aspects of the migration projections, 
which is why I will look into the details of both categories. 
Initially, with the research of possible migration flows in the 1990s, there was 
some uncertainty about the particular countries which were going to be 
included in the first accession wave. For that reason, some of the researchers 
took a broader stance and researched the countries in the whole region of 
Central and East Europe. What is more, although far from homogeneous, 
those countries exhibited some common trends. Depending on the 
methodology used, researchers predicted migration amounting to between 2% 
and 5% of the population of the new member states in the long run.
32 Within 
this range, Boeri et. al. (2007) predicted that the highest levels of migration 
 
32  Boeri, Tito/Brücker, Herbert/Iara Anna, et. al., “Labor mobility within the EU in the 
context of enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements”, 
European Integration Consortium, Nürnberg, 2009. 
Online at: ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2509&langId=en. Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
 
 25
were expected from Romania, Bulgaria and Poland.
33 However, there were 
some extreme predictions for migration flows of up to 7% of the population
34, 
but they were rather the exception, not the rule. 
The studies pointed out that there were various pull and push factors relevant 
to migration, such as differences in living standards, wages, chances for 
employment, etc. It was difficult to give an accurate estimation of the 
migration flows because there was no record of free movement between East 
and West after the Second World War, having in mind the decade-long 
separation of the continent by the Iron curtain.
35 Moreover, all estimations 
relied on a wide range of assumptions, which contributed to the high degree 
of uncertainty they exhibited. Last but not least, even when researchers relied 
on direct interviews of citizens from member states, the difference between 
intentions and actual migration should be kept in mind. 
The second group of studies, those which looked into specific countries, could 
give more accurate information as to the migration flows to be expected after 
the 2007 enlargement. Attempts to project migration from Bulgaria and 
Romania began as early as 1992. Layard et al. used the migration waves from 
previous enlargements for their estimations. The figure which they arrived at 
was 49 000 short-term migrants (from a few weeks to a few years) from  
Bulgaria and 131 000 from Romania.
36 Even though they estimated these 
numbers as negligible compared to the total population, we should say that 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were the countries from which the highest 
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numbers of migrants were expected. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999)
37 quoted 
a study by the International Organization for Labor, which ranked Bulgaria 
and Romania among the top seven countries in Central and East Europe 
whose citizens had stated that it was “very likely” or “likely” they would go 
and work abroad after their countries joined the EU. As already noted, the 
difference between intentions and actual migration should be taken into 
account. However, the same study revealed that Bulgaria and Romania were 
again in the top seven countries whose citizens had taken actual steps in 
preparation to migrate (e.g. language courses, application for jobs). This 
meant that not only did people intend to work abroad, but they also took 
practical steps in that direction. This was a reason to expect that the flows of 
work migrants from Bulgaria and Romania would be among the highest in the 
region. 
A comprehensive volume “Labor mobility within the EU in the context of 
enlargement and the functioning of the transitional arrangements” (2007) 
featured country studies of 15 old and new member states, among which were 
Bulgaria and Romania. The studies examined the labor market in each 
country, the economic background, stock and characteristics of potential 
migrants. The Bulgarian study stated that after the fall of communism in 
1989, between 500 000 and 700 000 people had left the country.
38 However, 
there was a tendency for a decrease in the number of people wishing to work 
abroad between 2001 and 2006 – according to the National Migration and 
Integration Strategy, the intentions for long-term migration had declined by 
about 50%. At the same time, the potential for short-term immigration was 
still relatively high at 12.1%. The research for Romania suggested that there 
was a strong tendency for increase of migration flows after 1990. A quoted 
OSCD study estimated that the annual inflow of Romanian nationals in the 
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OSCD countries had been steadily increasing, peaking at 202 000 in 2004. 
The tendency for an over-proportional increase of migrant workers was more 
than evident and persisted over time. More importantly, there was a clear 
preference for certain destination countries for Romanian migrant workers, 
mostly Spain and Italy. In 1999 there were 10 000 Romanians in Spain but 
their number surged to 192 000 by 2005.
39 This illustrates the general 
tendency and is especially relevant to the topic which will be discussed in Part 
5. 
A final study states that 17% of Bulgarians and 26.1% of Romanians intended 
to live and work in the EU.
40 This ranked the countries among the top 
potential sources of work migrants and is important to understand the 
attitudes towards Bulgaria and Romania on the eve of the enlargement. 
This overview is especially relevant, within the context of the transitional 
measures, as they aim to restrict the flows of migrant workers. On the whole, 
Bulgaria and Romania were expected to account for significantly larger 
migration flows in comparison with the countries of the 2004 enlargement. 
This became a powerful argument during the debate about transitional 
arrangements. However, in order to present the discussion in its entirety, a 
few more aspects need to be considered. There were other important 
differences between the 2004 and 2007 enlargements which contributed to the 
increased reluctance of the old member states to allow free movement of 
workers from Bulgaria and Romania. 
The first important difference is the larger gap in living standards and real 
wages between Bulgaria and Romania and the EU than the Central and East 
European countries and the EU. In the 2004 enlargement, the variations 
between the GNP per capita as a percentage of the EU-15 varied within the 
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range of 11% (Latvia) to 42% (Slovenia).
41 The gross wages and salaries were 
between 10% (Latvia) and 46% (Slovenia) from the EU-15 average.
42 In 
comparison, the GNP per capita for Bulgaria was estimated at 6% of the EU-
15 average and for Romania – at 7%.
43 The gross wage in Bulgaria was 6% of 
the EU-15 and in Romania – 9%.
44 These huge differences meant a greater 
stimulus to migrate in pursuit of higher wages, which certainly was an 
undesired development for old member states. 
The second argument to be considered is that after the 2004 enlargement, 
some countries, in particular the UK and Ireland, received far more migrants 
than expected. In combination with internal political reasons, this was an 
important motivation for them to consider transitional arrangements. It should 
not be forgotten that in 2006 a number of states removed the restrictions for 
countries from the 2004 enlargement. Naturally, the expected numbers of 
work migrants from the 2004 accession were fewer than from the 2007 one 
and this was an additional stimulus for old member states not to open the 
labor markets immediately. 
Another very important motive is related to the overall situation of the 
acceding countries in 2007. As compared to the 2004 countries, the reforms 
and adjustments in Bulgaria and Romania had proceeded at a slower pace. 
Corruption, the inefficient functioning of the judicial system, the grey 
economy and the privatization of state owned assets were problems which had 
persisted during the whole negotiation process. They were not fully overcome 
before the actual accession and even now continue to be criticized by the 
Commission. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania is widely perceived to 
have been a political decision instead of recognition of the actual progress of 
the countries. This was a reason for older member states to be more cautious 
and explains their desire to erect protective barriers between themselves and 
the two countries despite their accession to the EU.  
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All these aspects, in combination with economic considerations and 
projections for future migration flows were vital when negotiating the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Eventually, transitional arrangements 
were included in the 2005 Accession treaty. In comparison with the 2004 
enlargement, the UK and Ireland also imposed restrictions to access to their 
labor markets. What is more, many of the countries which joined in 2004 also 
imposed a transitional period. The formula was again “2+3+2” and the 
specificities of the arrangements will be analyzed below. 
3.3.2. Transitional Arrangements in the Accession Treaty 
The transitional arrangements applying to Bulgaria and Romania are 
stipulated in Annexes VI and VI to the Accession treaty.
45 The fundamental 
freedom of movement for workers is laid down in Article III – 133 of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and later incorporated in the 
Treaty of Lisbon as Article 45. The relevant secondary acts which elaborate 
on the details of the application of the free movement of workers are 
Directive 96/71/EC and Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68, later replaced by 
Regulation (EU) 492/2011. 
Essentially, there is no difference between the transitional arrangements 
applying to countries from the 2004 enlargement and the transitional 
arrangements applying to Bulgaria and Romania. The only two variations 
concern the relevant treaty articles regulating the free movement of workers 
and the specific definition of the family of the worker given in the Annexes 
for Bulgaria and Romania. The regulation of the transitional period is 
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identical for the two countries. This is why for convenience I will analyze 
only Annex VI referring to Bulgaria as applying for both. 
According to Annex VI, for a transitional period Articles 1 through 6 of 
Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 shall not apply. Instead, national measures or ones 
resulting from bilateral agreements between Bulgaria and Romania and the 
old member states shall apply. However, an exception is made for workers 
from the two new member states who were previously employed or given 
access to the labor markets of the EU-25 for a period longer than 12 months. 
Those workers shall enjoy full freedom of movement irrespective of the 
restrictions applying to their country of origin. This provision gives clear 
preference to workers who were active on a long-term basis on the labor 
market of an old member state. This right, however, shall be taken away if 
they voluntarily leave the labor market of the country where they are 
employed.
46 
At the end of the first two-year phase of the transitional period, the 
Commission shall prepare a report on the functioning of the transitional 
arrangements, on the basis of which the Council shall review them. Following 
this review, the old member states shall decide whether to extend the 
application of restrictions until the end of the five-year period or not. If they 
wish to avail themselves of this right, they need to notify the Commission 
before the end of the initial two-year phase and the absence of such 
notification shall mean that the suspended Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation 
(EEC) 1612/68 apply in their entirety.
47 
Bulgaria and Romania can request one further review, which follows the 
procedure described above.
48 
The application of the restrictive measures by an old member state can be 
extended for a further and final period of two years, following the expiration 
of the initial period of five years. However, this should be justified by 
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“serious disturbances of the labor market of its labor market or threat 
thereof”
49. This extension requires prior notification to the Commission. 
If a member state applied Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 
during the Transitional period but still issues work permits for monitoring 
purposes, it can continue doing so automatically. 
A member state which has already abandoned the application of transitional 
arrangements with regard to Bulgaria and Romania can avail itself of a 
mechanism to protect itself in the event of serious disturbances on its labor 
market, or risk of such. The “safeguard clause” is laid down in Paragraph 7, 
which envisages that until the end of the seven-year period and in the 
circumstances stated above, a member state can suspend the application of 
Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68. This can be done if it 
notifies the Commission and the other member states and provides them with 
the relevant information justifying the decision. The Commission decides on 
the duration and scope of the suspension. In “urgent and exceptional cases”
50 
a member state can suspend the application of the articles prior to the 
notification of the Commission. It is important to note that the protection of 
the safeguard clause is not only reserved for old member states. Bulgaria and 
Romania can also avail themselves of it under the conditions listed in 
Paragraph 7.
51 
Paragraph 8 settles the issue of family members of workers from Bulgaria and 
Romania employed in member states which apply the transitional 
arrangements. It stipulates that the suspension of Articles 1 through 6 of 
Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 does not prevent the application of Article 23 of 
Directive 2004/38/EC. According to it, the family members of a union citizen 
who have the right to reside in a country shall also have access to the labor 
market of the country of residence. Despite the restrictions, the transitional 
arrangements apply only to the access of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals 
to the labor market. Once a person is legally employed, they cannot be 
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discriminated in any way with regard to the conditions of employment. The 
family members of the worker also avail themselves of these rights. 
It is important to note that whenever a transitional arrangement is applied to 
Bulgaria and Romania, they can treat the restricting states in a reciprocal 
manner.
52 
Member states are free to decide whether to apply transitional arrangements 
o r  n o t .  H o w e v e r ,  e v e n  i f  t h e y  d o  not decide to open their labor markets 
completely at the date of accession of new member states, they can do so at 
any time after the second year of membership of Bulgaria and Romania.
53 
Paragraph 13 of Annex VI contains special provisions referring to Germany 
and Austria and addresses their concerns about the freedom to provide 
services in some sensitive areas. Restrictions to this freedom require prior 
notification to the Commission and new member states can respond with 
reciprocal measures. 
Despite the various restrictive regimes which can result from the transitional 
arrangements, none can be stricter than what was in force at the date of 
accession. Moreover, the nationals of these two states should be given 
preference in comparison with third country nationals. Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens and their families shall also not be treated more 
restrictively than the nationals of countries outside the EU. Once having 
legally entered the labor market of a member state, Bulgarian and Romanian 
workers cannot be discriminated against with regard to the conditions of 
employment whatsoever. 
To summarize, the goal of the transitional arrangements is to erect barriers 
preventing the free access of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to the labor 
market of the old member states. The old member states have the opportunity 
to apply regimes resulting from bilateral agreements, transitional 
arrangements as laid down in the Annexes, or open their labor markets 
completely. Even if they do so, they have the opportunity to reintroduce 
restrictions, in case the situation on their labor markets drastically changes. 
 
52   Paragraph 10, Annex VI. 
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This is essential with a view to the issue to be discussed in Part 5. Bulgaria 
and Romania, on their part, are free to apply reciprocal measures towards 
countries which restrict their citizens. Interestingly, neither country has 
decided to do so. They can also apply the safeguard clause towards each other 
in case of necessity. Last but not least, Bulgarian and Romanian nationals 
should be given preference in comparison with third country nationals and 
once employed, should not work under conditions different from those for 
citizens of the host member state. 
We can thus conclude that despite the fact that the transitional arrangements 
are restrictive towards the new member states, they give some protection in 
both directions, e.g. through reciprocal treatment and the two-way application 
of the safeguard clause. However, in reality this attempt fails to achieve 
fairness, as the conditions are determined by the old member states and the 
actions which Bulgaria and Romania can take in response to them are 
disproportionate. 
3.3.3.  Fears and Reality – Were the Initial Concerns Justified 
As presented in part 3.3.1., the expectations of flows of migrant workers from 
Bulgaria and Romania were very diverse. This was due to the different 
methodologies used for the estimations and the scarcity of available data. The 
estimation of actual migration flows is difficult and ambiguous. The 
Commission states in its report of 2008 that the estimation of the number of 
migrants is difficult due to insufficient data and largely open borders between 
the member states. However, I will refer to the findings of a few reports in an 
attempt to give as thorough a picture of the post-accession developments as 
possible. 
The Commission reports that the number of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens 
residing in the old member states rose from 690 000 at the end of 2003 to 1.8 
million at the end of 2007. This was an increase from 0.2% of the population 
of EU-15 to 0.5%.
54 Both countries exhibited high mobility rates, amounting 
 
54   European Commission, Report on the first phase (1 January 2007-31 December 2008) 
of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as 
requested according to the Transitional Arrangement set out in the 2003 Accession 
Treaty, Brussels, 2008. Desislava Kraleva 
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to 1.7% of the working age population of Bulgaria and 2.5% of the Romanian 
working age population.
55 This ranks among the highest mobility rates 
demonstrated by new member states. Similarly, as in the 2004 enlargement, 
migration is not evenly distributed within the EU. However, in contrast, the 
main destination countries for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens are Spain and 
Italy. Greece ranks third for Bulgarian workers, followed by Germany. This 
tendency began well before accession and continued afterwards. Brücker
56 
reports 360 000 migrants from Bulgaria and Romania went to Spain between 
2000 and 2005, which he describes as “striking”. Kahanec and Zimmermann
57 
also conclude that the enlargement had a serious impact on migration from 
new to old member states. 
However, despite the different estimations of post-enlargement migration, all 
researchers conclude that it is negligible when measured as part of the 
population of the EU-25. What is more, the Commission states that there is 
only a modest chance that the number of migrant workers increases in the 
future. According to its estimations, due to agreements signed before the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the flows have already peaked. 
Apart from the absolute numbers of the work migrants, it is crucial to analyze 
their impact on the labor markets and the economy of the host countries as a 
whole. Here all researchers are unequivocal that migrant workers have largely 
had a positive impact on the destination countries. This effect has been 
manifested through an increase in the GDP of the receiving countries. The 
Commission notes that as a result of the enhanced mobility following the 
2007 enlargement, the GDP of the enlarged EU increased with 0.5% in the 
short term and 0.27% in the long term.
58 The effect on unemployment is also 
 
55   Ibid. 
56  Brücker, Herbert, “Labor Mobility After the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement: 
Who Wins, Who Loses?”, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 
Washington: 2007. 
57   Kahanec, Martin and Klaus Zimmermann, “Migration in an enlarged EU: A 
challenging solution?”, European Commission, Economic Papers 363, Brussels: 2009. 
58   European Commission, Report on the first phase (1 January 2007-31 December 2008) 
of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2005 Accession Treaty and as 
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reported to be minor and negligible, as well as the impact on the welfare 
systems of the receiving countries. One of the major concerns of the old 
member states, that they would get huge inflows of welfare tourists, was also 
not justified. Moreover, the employment rates of migrant and domestic 
workers were found to converge, as their labor was more complementary than 
substitutive. All these findings reveal that despite a larger numbers of work 
migrants, the labor markets of the receiving states were not disrupted, but on 
the contrary, that these inflows had largely positive effects for their 
economies. 
A further issue which needs to be addressed is what is the relationship 
between the large numbers of work migrants and the transitional 
arrangements? Why is it that despite the transitional arrangements there is a 
larger-than-expected influx? The answer is twofold. On the one hand, long 
before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, their citizens were free to 
work in old member states on the basis of bilateral agreements (e.g. Spain). 
To a large extent this explains the substantial migration waves prior to 
enlargement. On the other hand, labor migration is driven by factors other 
than restrictions imposed by the transitional arrangements, namely the general 
demand and supply of labor. The Commission also states this in its report and 
concludes that the labor markets are able to regulate themselves and that the 
demand for labor would decrease in the downturn of the business cycle, as an 
answer to the concerns of some member states that they would receive a high 
influx in difficult economic times. 
To this end, the effect of the transitional arrangements is doubtful. Due to 
bilateral agreements, various pull factors and special clauses for certain types 
of workers, they do not manage to significantly restrict migration flows. 
Member states themselves create special categories of migrants in order to 
circumvent the limitations they have imposed, an example of these are British 
“blue cards”. In this way old member states “pick and choose” only certain 
kinds of work migrants. At the same time, the mere existence of transitional 
arrangements clearly limits one of the fundamental freedoms of the European 
Union and thus creates a “second class” Union citizenship. This is an issue 
with legal, political and symbolic significance which needs to be addressed. 
This is especially relevant now that the concept of Union citizenship is fully Desislava Kraleva 
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developed and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is an integral part of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
4.  The Standstill Clause and its Functioning in Practice – 
the Case of the Netherlands 
The standstill clause is a protective mechanism for new member states 
guaranteeing them treatment at least equal to that in force at the date of 
accession and by no means stricter. The standstill clause however can also be 
used in the reverse way. This occurs when a more liberal regime is replaced 
by a stricter one until it reaches the minimum guaranteed by the standstill 
clause. This does not violate the provisions of the accession treaties as it does 
not go below the set minimum. However, in practice it gives old member 
states the opportunity to limit the fundamental freedoms of new member 
states to the standard in force at the date of signing the accession treaties, i.e. 
prior to accession. In this way the new members of the European Union can 
be deprived even of already restricted freedoms, thus removing a significant 
aspect of EU membership. 
The standstill clause for Bulgaria and Romania is stipulated in Paragraph 14 
of Annexes VI and VII to the Accession treaty of 2005. 
In April 2011 a situation as the one described above was created. On 12 April 
2011 the Netherlands announced their intention to start issuing work permits 
to Bulgarian and Romanian citizens only in “exceptional cases”
59, thus 
reversing the regime back to its state at the moment of signing of the 
Accession treaty in 2005. The measure was announced by the Social Affairs 
Minister Henk Kamp and supported by the Dutch government. Despite the 
controversial welcome it received, the decision entered into force on 1 July 
2011. Since then, no work permits have been issued to Bulgarian or 
Romanian citizens. 
 
59   EurActiv, “Netherlands curbs Bulgarian, Romanian workers”, Brussels, 2011. 
Online at: http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/netherlands-curbs-bulgarian-
romanian-workers-news-504028?utm_source=EurActiv%20Newsletter&utm_ 
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Until the change, the access of Bulgarians and Romanians to the Dutch labor 
market was already restricted as workers from these countries were subject to 
the obligatory acquisition of a work permit prior to employment. This was the 
system of the transitional arrangements which the Netherlands applied to 
Bulgaria and Romania. The introduced changes effectively excluded 
Bulgarian and Romanian workers from the Dutch labor market and put them 
on an equal footing with third country nationals. While the restoration of the 
regime in force at the date of accession does not contradict the provisions of 
the Accession treaty, the lack of preference for Bulgarian and Romanian 
workers clearly contradicts the second subparagraph of Annexes VI and VII, 
which requires that the nationals of the countries in a transitional period 
receive preferential treatment. 
On 28 April 2011 the Commission announced that it would investigate the 
legality of the actions of the Dutch government. Matthew Newman, 
spokesman for EU fundamental rights commissioner Viviane Reding, said 
that "The European Commission will check whether the new rules proposed 
by the Netherlands for access to its labor market are in line with European 
legislation that ensures the free movement of people"
60. No further news on 
the development of the investigation was delivered. 
In pursuit of accurate and actual information on the issue, I researched and 
discovered that the unit which is working on the issue is B/4 Free Movement 
of Workers; Coordination of Social Security Schemes of DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion. In response to my inquiries I was sent a letter 
with the official position of the Commission by the head of the unit. The letter 
was sent on 29.09.2011 and has the Reference number (2011)1030257.
61 The 
Commission states its opinion that the Netherlands has not violated EU law as 
they are availing themselves of an instrument legally conferred to them. The 
reference to the standstill clause once again emphasizes the right of the Dutch 
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government to return to the regime valid at the date of signing of the 
Accession treaty. Moreover, the transitional arrangements applying to 
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals have prevented the full application of the 
free movement of workers following the accession of the two countries. 
However, the Commission admits that the practice of the national institutions 
in the Netherlands has changed since 1 July 2011 and has become 
significantly stricter. Importantly, the Commission states that it finds the 
actions of the Netherlands in compliance with EU law and is not in the 
process of investigating their actions. 
This is important not only because it differs from the initial announcement 
and statements, but also because it reveals the attitude of the Commission 
towards the application of the standstill clause. Even though in this situation it 
introduces more stringent treatment, its application closely follows the 
prescriptions of the Accession treaty and the Annexes to it. This is why a 
conclusion that there was no violation needs to be made. 
However, in its letter, the Commission reveals that an investigation has been 
launched against the Netherlands on a similar matter. The grounds for the 
investigation is the government paper entitled “Action on labor migration 
from Central and Eastern Europe”, presented by the Social Affairs Minister 
Henk Kamp to the Dutch parliament. The Commission is concerned that some 
of the measures envisaged in this paper might constitute infringements of EU 
law. The Commission is “in contact” with the Dutch authorities on the matter. 
However, due to the ongoing nature of the investigation and the sensitivity of 
the issue, no further information was divulged by the Commission. 
The letter is a clear example of the role of the Commission as guardian of the 
Treaties. It strictly monitors their application and observes that member states 
avail themselves only of the instruments conferred to them by the Treaties. 
However, if a member state goes beyond the realm of its powers and threatens 
to infringe a treaty provision conferring rights to individuals, the Commission 
takes action to clarify the nature of the measures. 
With regard to the free movement of workers, the usage of the standstill 
clause has a dual effect. On the one hand, it is used as a legal instrument 
available to member states, to return to the initial regimes they applied to new Free Movement of Workers in the EU 
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member states. On the other hand it puts into question the standstill clause, 
which was intended to guarantee minimum treatment for the nationals of new 
member states. It shows that the standstill clause can also be used to reduce 
the privileges that such nationals have available, to the point where they have 
equal rights only with non-EU citizens. This is even more important 
considering the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is incorporated 
into the Treaty of Lisbon, thus giving it the same legal value. In fact, the 
actions of the Dutch government remove the substance of EU membership in 
this particular aspect for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. 
The result of the Commission investigation with regard to the proposed Dutch 
paper is yet to be seen. 
5.  The Safeguard Clause and its Functioning in Practice 
– the Case of Spain 
The transitional arrangements from both the 2004 and 2007 enlargement 
include a so-called safeguard clause. It can be found in Paragraph 7 of 
Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and XIII to the Accession Treaty of 
2003 and Paragraph 7 of Annexes VI and VII to the Accession Treaty of 
2007. The safeguard clause stipulates that if a member state has decided to 
apply Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 to a new member 
state before the end of the seven year period following accession, it can 
reintroduce restrictions within this time-frame. This can be done if the 
member state in question experiences or has valid reasons to predict serious 
disturbances on its labor market. In such a case, it needs to inform the 
Commission and the other member states of its intention to reintroduce 
restrictions. The member state in question needs to present all relevant 
evidence in support of its demand. The Commission has the discretion to 
decide on this request, as it can suspend wholly or partially the application of 
Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68. The Commission also 
determines the period for which the application of the articles is suspended as 
well as the scope to which it refers. The decision should be notified to the 
Council and within two weeks of its adoption any member state can request 
the Council amend or annul it. Desislava Kraleva 
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There is an exception to the rule of prior notification of the Commission, 
namely in “urgent and exceptional cases”, where the affected member state 
can suspend the application of the articles and subsequently notify the 
Commission of its reasons to do so. 
The safeguard clause gives an incentive to member states applying restrictions 
to reconsider their decision and remove them. Knowing that they can 
reintroduce limitations in case of undesired changes on their labor markets, 
member states feel more protected and thus are more willing to lift the 
barriers before the expiration of the full Transitional period. Until 2011, none 
of the member states had resorted to the safeguard clause. 
However, 2011 brought a change in this respect. Spain became the first state 
which successfully activated the safeguard clause. What is more, the country 
availed itself of the procedure applicable in urgent cases and suspended the 
application of Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 prior to the 
notification of the Commission and the other member states. This was done 
on 22 July 2011. The reasoned explanation followed on 28 July 2011. After 
carefully considering the country’s motivation, the Commission issued a 
decision on 11 August 2011 in which it recognized the legitimacy of the 
actions of Spain. 
The reasons why Spain availed itself of the safeguard clause are twofold. The 
first reason is the extremely high unemployment rate in the country, which 
has persisted over an extended period of time. The country has the highest 
unemployment rate in the EU at 21.2%, as announced by Eurostat in July 
2011.
62 In addition, it also holds the highest ranking for youth unemployment 
with 46.2% of people under 25 being unemployed.
63 The second reason is the 
economic situation in the country. Spain suffered badly from the economic 
crises and still cannot recover. Their GDP growth lag behind the average of 
the Eurozone and in the first quarter of 2011 was only 0.3% in comparison 
with an average of 0.8% for the Eurozone. Furthermore, the country is faced 
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with the urgent need to introduce further budgetary constraints, which will not 
encourage the recovery of its economy and growth of employment rates. 
This economic background also saw a tendency for a growing inflow of labor 
migrants. The number of Romanian nationals resident in Spain increased from 
388 000 in 2006 to 823 000 in 2010. Furthermore, despite low labor demand, 
the inflow of Romanian citizens continued, thus resulting in more than 30% 
unemployment rate among them. Against the background of slow economic 
recovery and high unemployment rates, this posed a considerable burden on 
the Spanish social security system and seriously distorted the labor market. 
These were the reasons for Spain to activate the safeguard clause. Fearing that 
the time span between the request to the Commission to suspend the 
application of Articles 1 through 6 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and the 
actual enforcement of the decision would allow for even more unemployed 
persons to register as jobseekers, Spain used the urgent procedure provided 
for in Paragraph 7 of Annex VII. The Commission’s decision confirmed the 
legality of Spain’s actions and allowed it to keep the restrictions in force until 
31 December 2012.
64 
However, there are some limitations to the reapplication of restrictions. They 
do not affect Romanian citizens who are already employed in Spain or 
registered as jobseekers at the time of entry into force of the decision.
65 
Moreover, the application of the Decision is subject to the transitional 
arrangements laid down in Annex VII of the 2005 Accession Treaty.
66 Spain 
is obliged to closely monitor its labor market and prepare reports on a 
quarterly basis, the first report due by 31 December 2011.
67 If there are any 
developments on the labor market, the country shall promptly inform the 
Commission. If the changes are significant enough or the measures prove to 
be more restrictive than intended, the Commission has the right to amend or 
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repeal its decision.
68 Spain shall also inform the Commission of the effect of 
the steps taken within a period of two months.
69 
With these actions Spain creates a precedent in the history of the transitional 
arrangements. Never before has a member state which had lifted the 
restrictions towards new member states relied on the safeguard clause in order 
to reintroduce them. The specific economic situation in Spain in particular 
and Europe as a whole as well as the continuing migration flows have made 
this step necessary for the country. However, in Paragraph 14 of its decision 
the Commission states that the imposition of restrictions on union citizens is 
derogation from the fundamental right to free movement and should be 
interpreted restrictively. This is indicative of the overall approach of the 
Commission and its attitude towards the transitional arrangements in general. 
The revocation of the safeguard clause illustrates the protection that old 
member states enjoy during the seven-year period after the accession of new 
member states. Even if they have removed all restrictions, they can still rely 
on this clause in cases of serious disruptions. From the point of view of the 
imposing member state, this may offer a temporary relief and a chance to 
restore its labor markets to normal, by removing the threat of a certain group 
of foreign workers. From the point of view of the restricted country, this is a 
limitation of a fundamental freedom, deviating from the concept that labor 
markets are able to self-regulate and even leads to the creation of a second-
hand citizenship of the EU. The precise effect of the safeguard clause is 
unclear. While it may serve to achieve the initial goal, it may also delay 
needed structural changes on the labor markets. What the exact result will be 
is yet to be seen. 
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Conclusion 
As seen, the transitional arrangements are not a new phenomenon in the 
history of European integration. Being first implemented towards Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, they were later applied in the 2004 and 2007 enlargement 
waves. The disturbing lack of a sufficient economic foundation has not been 
an obstacle for older member states to restrict one of the fundamental 
freedoms of new entrants. The evidence shows that the initial fears were 
unjustified and that the impact of enlargement has been largely positive. 
Against this background, there is a consistent tendency for applying 
transitional arrangements in every new enlargement wave. The actual reason 
rests in political considerations, which are hardly a legitimate reason for the 
restriction of the free movement of workers throughout the union. The actions 
of the Netherlands and Spain prove the hypothesis that the primary function 
of transitional arrangements is to serve the interests of old member states and 
the two-way protection envisaged by the Treaties is only an illusion. 
The issue of insufficiently grounded restrictions is even more serious after the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
made it a primary source of Union law. The legal, political and symbolic 
significance of any limitations is thus comparably greater. The sensitivity of 
the issue is growing and it should be treated with extreme caution. 
However, the last two months demonstrated that states applying the 
transitional arrangements are determined to use all available legal instruments 
in order to protect their interests. The Netherlands and Spain applied the 
standstill and safeguard clauses respectively, thus bringing the free movement 
of Bulgarian and/or Romanian workers to an absolute minimum. This 
tendency is alarming, as we now see a practice of consistently limiting one of 
the fundamental freedoms is being established. On an even graver note, the 
future does not promise to bring positive developments in this respect. The 
limitation of the free movement of workers is likely to continue, thus 
questioning not only the core of EU membership but the foundation of the EU 
as a whole. 
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